Fall of ideologies, change of values
Two seminars of the sociologist Raymond Boudon in Trento
Interview by Enzo Rutigliano to Raymond Boudon


Raymond Boudon, one of the most well-known and authoritative sociologists internationally, teaches at the Sorbonne in Paris and at the Faculty of Sociology in Trento. Here he has recently held two seminars on two fundamental issues of today’s sociological debate: the problem of values and the “state of the art” of sociology. Or rather, the actual existence of the discipline, problem which rises from the dissemination of the interpretative paradigms and their irreparable partiality concerning the knowledge of social phenomena. Moreover, he has disserted about the impossibility of catching - “from one mind, from one heart” (Th. W. Adorno) - the complexity of contemporary social reality and enclose it in a theory. We have asked him a few questions on these important issues.

What is the relationship between the fall of the ideologies and the fall of the values? Is there a relationship of cause and effect between the two events?

The decline of values has been much exaggerated by popular but also by armchair sociology. If we look at data drawn from surveys the impression is quite different. Thus, in my small book on the question (Déclin de la morale? Déclin des valeurs?, Paris, Puf, 2002), I have analysed data drawn from the World survey on values conducted by Inglehart. The data I have explored deal with seven Western countries (Canada, France, Germany (W), Italy, Sweden, UK, US). The general impression do be drawn when comparing the younger age group (16-24) with the older (54 and more) is that of a slow evolution: the younger believe in the indispensability of authority but want a little more frequently than the older that a command be justified; they believe in the distinction between good and evil, but recognise a little more frequently that it is not always easy to apply these categories to given situations; they believe in the duties of parents toward children and of children toward parents; in most countries, a strong majority believes in marriage, in the family almost as frequently as the elder; they believe in democracy, but are more eager to participate and not to leave the political system to the responsibility of political personal. On the whole, one draws from the data the impression that the younger have the same values as the elder; but they are more self-assertive; more critical; more tolerant; more sensitive to the complexity of social, economic and political phenomena and for this reason more reluctant to endorse political extremism, right as well as left extremism; the younger appear in summary as more individualistic but not less attached to values. These various changes should, as the data suggest, be considered as due for a good part to education: those with a higher education in the younger group illustrate these changes more markedly than the less educated. So, we do not observe a real decline of values, but rather a growing assertion of individualistic values and a development of the rationalisation of values. Thus, the moral rules appearing as taboos are rejected to the benefit of the basic moral value of the respect toward the others. This type of evolution was predicted by Durkheim as well as Weber, each in his own words. The impression of the decline of values is due for a good part to a confusion: the fact that the number of drug addicts increases as well as the number of delinquents is one thing; it does not mean that drug addiction or delinquency have become positively valued. All observations show that drug addicts are not easily accepted and that they even do not accept themselves. Behaviour should not be confused with the evaluation of behaviour. So, I would say in answer to your question that there is no real decline of values nor of moral principles, but changes in the frequency of many types of behaviour due notably to a growing general tolerance. As to the ideologies, there is an evident decline of great ideologies, of those ideologies which propose an overall world view. This has to be related with the fact that the world is no more divided into big competitive world views incorporated into political systems; but also to an overall increase in the level of education (in Western countries) and in the sense of the complexity of social, economic and political phenomena. It must be recognised complementarily that, if great ideologies belong to the past, what I would call “small” ideologies are and will always be present. As societies are unfair to many people, there will always be a demand and a supply for easy recipes supposed to make societies better, the effectiveness of which will for most of them be far for warranted. 

Is the crisis of sociology – considered as reading and organization of society (Orientierungslehre) – as it was at its origins – a crisis of orientation (Orientierungskrise)? Has the dissemination of the sociological paradigms, alternative one to the other, and the statement of micro-sociologies in stead of the big theories which deal with the social changes, the social stratification, the big action theories, etc. contributed to the current crisis of sociology as unable to give an explanation of the running of society?

The present crisis of sociology is essentially due –according to the diagnosis I submit in Y a-t-il encore une sociologie, Paris, Odile Jacob, 2003)- to the fact that many sociologists do not accept, say, Tocqueville’s, Weber’s or Durkheim’s view that sociology should be essentially devoted, as any scientific discipline, to explain phenomena within its jurisdiction that are hard to explain. Thus, Tocqueville has shown that the high level of centralisation in France explained many of the differences between France and the UK. He explained why the Americans are more religious than the Europeans. Durkheim explained why people endorse magical beliefs or why suicide rates vary in function of a number of variables. Weber explained that economic development was stimulated by some religious world views. Today, sociology appears as oriented in many cases by a demand from the State, the political parties, the social movements and by various institutions. To take two examples: while Durkheim or Weber were concerned when they dealt with religious issues to explain the reasons why people endorse such and such types of religious beliefs, sociologists of religion are often more concerned by exploring the degree, say, to which Protestantism threatens Catholicism in Latin America ; while the studies on public opinion in the two or three decades after the second world war were concerned with the theory of public opinion, i.e. to explore the reasons and mechanisms making that people believe what they believe, today, opinion surveys are proliferating, but rather used to predict the next polls or to check the popularity of political leaders than to explore the essential issue of public opinion. Generally, collective opinions and beliefs are today observed and measured rather than explained. Another cause of the crisis of sociology is the increase in the demand of sociology from the part of the media: this demand incites many sociologists to write quick easy to read essays of literary value, which in many cases bring little to our understanding of societies.

Has the proliferation of specialistic sociologies (sociology of the family, of gender, economic, political, of the environment etc.) contributed to the emptying of sociology as such, that is to say a sociology which could give a unitary explanation of the social phenomena? Have the specialistic sociologies dissolved instead of expand the influence of the sociological point of view, contributing to the crisis of the discipline?

The proliferation of specialised sociologies has to be related to the increasing demand of institutions, social movements, etc. I have just mentioned. It is true that a fragmentation of sociology results from this situation and that general sociology tends to be emptied. Beside the proliferation of specialised applied works, another factor of the fragmentation should be mentioned. In the fifties and sixties, general frameworks (functionalism, Marxism, structuralism, etc.) provided common denominators; in the following years, paradigms were offered and presented as having a general vocation (ethnomethodology, phenomenology, symbolic interactionism among others). They were vague and their influence remained limited in space and time. They gave soon the impression that they explained the obvious. The topic of networks has then become fashionable. But networks are a dimension of social life; not a sociological paradigm. Rational choice theory was then proposed. It is a paradigm, moreover precise and useful. Before it was identified as such, it was used by a Tocqueville and many other great sociologists. But it includes a much too narrow and rigid theory of rationality. My own view on the subject is that a version of methodological individualism incorporating a theory of rationality much more open and sophisticated than the utilitarian-instrumental theory of rationality presently endorsed by “rational choice theorists” is the secrecy accounting for the explanatory strength of the most solid and illuminating theories produced by classical and modern sociology. I have tried to say more on this topic in a recent small book (Raisons, bonnes raisons, Paris, Puf, 2003) and in the prefatory chapter of the Annual Review of Sociology (to appear in July 2003).